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Classical teachers who are seeking amusement, not unmixed with irritation, should read a paper entitled *A Critique of High School Latin*, by C. L. Staples, Instructor in Education and Psychology at the State Normal School, Millersville, Pa., which appeared in the December number of the *Pedagogical Seminary*. I append some extracts, which, however, do not do justice to the whole paper.

The study of the piano affords more liberal training than the study of Latin; for the latter trains only the brain and a special series of eye muscles, while the former includes training of the ear, hands, arms, feet, and body with the result of a social accomplishment and a possible future vocation.

Any teacher who maintains by magazine article or private conversation that the study of Latin is not rapidly dying in the American public high school is either blind to the drift of educational tendencies or is like the small politician, always verbally sure of election during his campaign speeches. He is a mere mouthpiece for educational white lies.

Culture and discipline are not confined to the Latin language or the Latin literature; culture and discipline are obtained from the study of every subject in the high school course.

The argument that the study of Latin words aids the knowledge of English words is a sound practical argument worthy of attention.

In 1909 appeared the revised edition of the *Vocabulary of High School Latin*. This list of 2000 Latin words may well be the list from which we can form a judgment as to the kind of Latin words our boys and girls are studying in American high schools.

In 1912 appeared a parallel list entitled the *Vocabulary of Practical Latin*, being the 2000 most important, scientific, professional Latin words in the *English Dictionary*.

Quoting from the preface of the first list the suggestion of a division of these 2000 words into approximately 500 words a year he proceeds:

Such is the ideal of Latin study announced by one of the greatest American universities. Think of it! Can it be that 1800 years after the death of Caesar the 500 words of most common occurrence in the four books of his *Gallie Wars* are the most useful, cultural, disciplinary, the most important Latin words for American boys and girls to learn in the first year of the high school? Certainly not, unless by a miraculous coincidence of fate.

Would that a chime of clarion bells ringing down the whole gamut of the musical scale would resound the astounding fact that the vocabulary of

the first year Latin in the American high school is an antiquated list 1800 years old of the 500 words mathematically appearing most often in Caesar's *Gallie War*. O senseless collection! And shame to American scholarship because so unthinking!

Conversation, criticism, and public opinion of American fathers and mothers should compel the vocabulary of Latin in the first year high school to be a new list of the 500 Latin words of greatest value in present-day English grammar, science and profession.

It seems incredible to state that not one question from all four papers <of recent Regents' Examinations> can be found in regard to the derivation or meaning of English words.

This educational error is revealed in the introduction to the *Vocabulary of High School Latin* where twelve pages are devoted to the composition and formation of Latin words and not one page is devoted to the composition and formation of English words derived from Latin. . . . This is but another glaring defect in the present, perverted conception of Latin study and only goes to substantiate the statement that Latin is taught blindly to-day. The aim and goal of the present method of Latin instruction in American high schools is not Latin for the sake of English but Latin for the sake of Latin—and that Latin, too, which existed in the days of Caesar, Cicero and Vergil, almost 2000 years ago.

And this is not the entire story. Many Latin words taught in the high school are a decided detriment because the meanings they originally possessed in Latin are far different from the meanings they now possess in modern science.

As examples he cites *opera*, in music, *focus* in physics, *ratio* in algebra, *impetus* in physics.

In the present vocabulary of high school Latin the words really of value from the point of view of information are in the ridiculously small proportion indicated below: medicine, architecture and mathematics, 1 each; physiology and botany, 3 each; zoology and anatomy, 4 each; chemistry, 6; law, 7; astronomy, 9. Less than 50 words out of the entire 2000 are of real use to the boy intending to select a professional vocation!

Finally, let us compare the two lists entitled the *Vocabulary of High School Latin*, the present course, and the *Vocabulary of Practical Latin*, those really useful words found in Webster's dictionary. The amazing fact is revealed that out of the entire 4000 Latin words of the two combined lists only 99 are common to both lists! American educators and teachers, just think of the fact that only 99 words out of the entire 2000 Latin words in the present high school course are useful from the

point of view of conveying to the student any valuable scientific or professional knowledge.

The statistics and arguments presented above . . . warrant the establishment of a parallel one year course of Applied Latin. . . . Such a parallel course would tend to exert greater intensity of interest in the students preparing for college because of their common purpose. And that far larger mass of students for whom the high school is the last institution of formal training would profit

1. by a Latin course better suited to their practical needs.

2. by a year's preparation for the study of modern inflected languages.

3. by valuable training in the foundations of English grammar and word-derivation, and finally,

4. by a direct knowledge of scientific Latin most intimately related to practical life.

I shall have some comments to make upon this vocational programme in the next issue. Meanwhile it may be added that upon enquiry it was found that this list of 2000 practical Latin words was embodied in a thesis presented to the University of Pennsylvania last spring, which is as yet unpublished. G. L.

ON THE LEGALITY OF THE TRIAL AND CON- DEMNATION OF THE CATILINARIAN CONSPIRATORS

This paper makes no attempt to deal with the question of evidence. Assuming the guilt of the accused to have been established, it aims to present the trial and the sentence in their historical and legal setting.

The right of appeal in cases affecting the *caput*—citizenship or life—was guaranteed to the Roman citizen by the Valerian and the Porcian laws. When, shortly before the time of the Gracchi, the Romans began to legislate for the establishment of standing courts, *quaestiones perpetuae*, with the power to try capital cases and to decide them finally, the people considered the new institution no infringement on their rights; for the transfer of judicial power from themselves to such a court was wholly voluntary on their part. Special judiciary commissions, *quaestiones extraordinariae*, were viewed in a different light. The custom of appointing such commissions for the trial and punishment of a particular individual or of a particular class of individuals had arisen in the fifth century B.C., in a time of almost absolute senatorial rule, and therefore the power of appointing such extraordinary commissions was vested in the senate¹. But when about the beginning of the third century B.C. popular sovereignty was well established, the third Valerian law, passed in 300 B.C., was so interpreted as to forbid the creation of a special court except by a vote of the people; this custom was adhered to throughout the third century. But after the close of the war with

Hannibal the senate began to resume the sovereign powers which it had exercised in the fifth century and had lost near the close of the fourth, and to abridge correspondingly the rights of the comitia. Early in the second century in two known instances it dared on its own responsibility to appoint special commissions for the trial of citizens. The first was created in 186 B.C. for the trial of the Bacchanalians²; the second occasion was the appointment of two commissions, in 180 B.C., for the detection and trial of poisoners in Rome and Italy³.

Similar in character to the special judiciary commission appointed by the senate, but far more sweeping in effect, was the *senatus consultum ultimum*: *Videant consules* <and perhaps other magistrates>, *ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat*. This in crises armed the consuls <and other magistrates> with absolute power of life and death over the citizens. By these means the senate circumvented the laws of appeal. It can be seen at once that the nobility might make use of this extraordinary power to rid itself of a political adversary, so as to render impossible any reform of which it did not approve.

Whether the senate should continue to exercise this power became a burning party question of the revolution initiated in the time of the Gracchi. Against its continuance Ti. Gracchus planned a new law, which he did not live to see enacted⁴. His own followers were ruthlessly condemned, without the privilege of appeal, by an extraordinary *quaestio* under P. Popillius Laenas, consul in 132 B.C.⁵ To put an end to such circumvention of a well-established right of the people, C. Gracchus in his first tribunate, 123 B.C., carrying into effect the plan of his brother, passed the often mentioned *Lex Sempronia De Provocatione*, which absolutely forbade capital sentence upon a citizen without an order of the people⁶. The wording of the statute indicates that it was intended, not to abolish extraordinary commissions and powers, but to allow their establishment in no other way than by popular vote. It reiterated, too, the article of the Porcian statute which prohibited the infliction of the death penalty on civilians⁷. Anyone who violated the statute could be brought by the tribunes before the comitia centuriata on a charge of *perduellio*, and could be punished by interdict from fire and water⁸.

It is well known that, in spite of this Sempronian statute, the senate took advantage of an election disturbance to pass the *senatus consultum ultimum* under which C. Gracchus, who had done no wrong, and

¹ Livy 39.8-19; C. I. L. 1.196 = 10.104.

² Livy 40.37.

³ Plutarch Ti. Gracch. 16.

⁴ Plutarch C. Gracch. 4; Cic. Lael. 37.

⁵ Cic. Rab. Perd. 12; Verr. 5. 163; Sest. 61; Schol. Gracov. 412; Schol. Ambros. 370; Plut. C. Gracch. 4.

⁶ Sall. Cat. 51; Cic. Cat. 1.28; 4.10.

⁷ Cic. Dom. 82; Plut. C. Gracch. 4.

⁸ 414 B.C. See Livy 4.50.6 ff.; for later cases see Livy 2.18; Val. Max. 2.5.3 and Livy 9.26.

many of his followers were murdered. Not content with this achievement, the same body appointed a special commission which mercilessly hunted down and put to death his adherents, without granting them an appeal. From that time to the end of the republic the *optimates* strenuously insisted that the senate had a right to issue the *consultum ultimum* and to appoint special courts at its discretion, whereas the *populares* as obstinately maintained that these acts were violations of law and destructive of liberty. The *optimates* readily acknowledged the validity of the Sempronian law and of all other laws of appeal, and claimed that they were as earnest upholders of these statutes as the *populares* could be. But they asserted that all the *leges de provocatione* were for the protection of the citizens only, and that those who attempted flagrantly to overthrow the republic ceased, by that very act, to be citizens, and were accordingly no longer under the protection of the laws. They claimed that private citizens had a right to slay such persons¹, and that it was even more the duty of the consul to lead a man like Catiline untried to death².

Accordingly, when the plottings of Catiline began to come to light, the senate passed the *consultum ultimum*, which clothed the consuls with absolute military and judicial power³. That Catiline and his associates were *hostes* Cicero constantly reiterates⁴. He asserts that by their own act they have forfeited their right to the citizenship and to the protection of the laws of appeal⁵. It is a curious fact that Caesar agreed with him that the Sempronian law did not protect these men⁶. The reason may be found in the circumstance that he was suspected of having a hand in the plot, and wished therefore to show himself not too favorably disposed toward the conspirators. To make himself appear as white as possible, he voiced a sentiment which his party utterly and eternally repudiated.

In the first Catilinarian Oration Cicero speaks of the *consultum ultimum*, for the simple reason that he is then thinking of proceeding alone as a magistrate to arrest and execute Catiline, the decree having given him this extraordinary right. But in the fourth Catilinarian, addressed likewise to the senate, he does not even hint at the existence of such a decree. What is the reason for this change of attitude? The answer is certain. He is now not simply threatening an arrest but is actually dealing with several prominent accomplices of Catiline, already under arrest, and he is unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of deciding their fate, even though backed by the *consultum ultimum*.

He has determined that the senate is to be the court for the trial of the case of these conspirators. This fact Professor Abbott has pointed out (*The Classical Journal* 2. 124). Cicero accordingly applies the term *iudicare* to the action of the senate in the case⁷, and afterward speaks of the procedure as a judicial trial⁸. This fact, too, is mentioned by Professor Abbott, who supposes, however, that the senate had no constitutional warrant for such an action. But from a good authority we learn that the warrant existed. In speaking of the powers of the senate in the time of the Punic Wars Polybius says (6.13.4): 'In like manner it is the business of the senate to deal with all crimes committed in Italy which demand a public investigation—I mean such cases as treason, conspiracy, poisoning and wilful murder'. These cases concerned non-citizens. Now, bearing in mind that in the view of the *optimates* the persons on trial had ceased to be citizens, we understand how it was that, according to the well-known Roman usage, the senate had jurisdiction over them.

This was the doctrine of the *optimates*. That the *populares* took an entirely different view of the proceedings soon became evident. On retiring from his consulship, December 31, 63, Cicero was forbidden by a tribune, Q. Metellus Nepos, to address the people. The ground alleged was that he had put Roman citizens to death untried⁹. The personal motive of the tribune should not obscure the fact that a vital issue was involved. The same must be said of the policy of P. Clodius Pulcher, tribune in 58 B.C., in relation to Cicero. This man was a strange compound of demagogue and statesman. We should judge him, not by the words of his eloquent adversary, but by his own public acts. Some of the *plebiscita* which he proposed and carried in his tribunate were wise and salutary. But we are here interested in the comitial act which prescribed the penalty of interdict from fire and water for anyone who had put to death a Roman citizen without trial¹⁰. Strengthening the Sempronian law of appeal, it forced the party issue as to whether that act could apply to persons accused of having attempted to overthrow the state. From a democratic point of view the Clodian law was not only just but necessary for the protection of personal liberty and in the interest of progress; but unfortunately Cicero, who in putting to death the associates of Catiline had simply acted for the senate, was made the scape-goat. Fearing condemnation under the law, Cicero voluntarily retired into exile, whereupon a new plebiscite declared the interdict to be legally in operation. Notwithstanding Cicero's repeated denunciations of the uncon-

¹ Cic. Cat. 1.3.

² Cic. Cat. 1.2.

³ Cic. Cat. 1.3, 4. On the fulness of the power see Sall. Cat. 29.

⁴ Cic. Cat. 1.5, 13, 27; 2.1, 11, 17.

⁵ Cic. Cat. 3.15.

⁶ Cat. 4.10.

⁷ Cat. 4.10, 18.

⁸ Pis. 7.14.

⁹ Plut. Cic. 23; Cic. Ad Fam. 5.2.7 and *pass.*

¹⁰ Vell. 2.45.1; Livy 103; Div. Coss. 38.14.4; Plut. Cic. 30.

stitutionality of the latter act, the tribunician assembly, in passing it, kept itself strictly within the limits of precedent¹.

In this paper we are considering, not the abstract equity or the expediency of the procedure, but the legality. The conflict of opinion—both ancient and modern—in the case can be rightly settled from the point of view neither of American nor of English usage, but solely on the ground of Roman law. And the question was decided adversely to the senate, in the Roman way, through the *Lex Clodia De Provocatione*, by the supreme power; for the Twelve Tables declare that what the people vote last shall be law and valid. In favor of Cicero's cause it must be said, however, that in the trial and execution of these conspirators he acted not capriciously and arbitrarily, but on a principle he believed to be legal and for the best interests of the commonwealth, which he dearly loved.

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GEORGE WILLIS BOTSFORD.

REVIEW

The Greek Genius and its Meaning to Us. By R. W. Livingstone. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press (1912). Pp. 250. \$2.00.

Mr. Livingstone disarms criticism by disclaiming finality. His object, on the whole admirably accomplished, is to stimulate and suggest, and to help other students of Greek life and literature, whether by agreement or disagreement, "to give some definition and coherency to the fleeting impressions, which are often all that is left after ten years' study of the Greeks". Ten years! It is the number of Epic convention and also of Philistine diatribes on the waste of time in classical education. Do they really study Greek ten years in England? No wonder that they find our Rhodes Scholars imperfectly prepared. I do not wish to cavil at the phrases which Mr. Livingstone employs to justify and recommend his ambitious undertaking. But the implication that the possession of a few comprehensive formulas summing up the Greek genius is the chief abiding value of the study of Greek is a wide-spread delusion of popular culture. It is this temper that constrains the extension lecturer on literature to harp on his author's 'message'. Is the Greek spirit the gospel of beauty, freedom, lucidity, directness, human versatility, or some happy blend of them all? And how many of these elements would be omitted by an optimistic exchange professor expounding the French, German or American spirit?

Mr. Livingstone, however, cleverly anticipates the objection that Greek civilization endured for fifteen hundred years and that the genius of this or of any race is too vast and complicated a thing to be summed up in a formula. In spite of exceptions,

variations and 'sports', there is a central tradition of what is most significant for us and at the same time perhaps most representative of the true national soul. It is this he seeks—in literature rather than in art and life, though he elsewhere, indeed, seems to contradict himself by saying that "the portrait which would serve us best is that of an ordinary man"—in Athens rather than in Sparta, and in the period 600-400 B.C. in which Nietzsche found the real Greece, though here again there is a touch of inconsistency when he later speaks of himself (204) as seeking "notes or characteristics which are found alike in Homer and in Lucian, in Herodotus and in the late epigrammatists of Byzantium".

Self-contradiction, indeed, is as inseparable from this theme as it is from mythology. The philosophy or science of literature is neither philology nor science. It is art, a form of rhetoric. This is not to condemn such work, as Mr. Livingstone's or the more sober book, *Greek View of Life*, by Mr. Lowes Dickinson, or the vast repertoires of opinions about the Greeks tabulated by Billeter. It is a branch of literature that appeals to the human instinct for short cuts to omniscience and Pisgah prospects of promised lands of culture. But it needs the control of the scholar's conscience in the writer and a challenging critical alertness in the reader; otherwise in striving for the impossible formula that shall express the totality of the Greek spirit we shall blur the definitions and distinctions that really explain and interpret a Pindar, an Aeschylus, a Sophocles, a Euripides, a Thucydides, a Plato, a Lucian. A generalization that excludes these or distorts our view of them may cost more than it gives.

Mr. Livingstone abandons himself to a succession of such generalizations, which he has not always succeeded in harmonizing with one another, or with his criticism of particular authors. His introductory chapters on The Note of Beauty, The Note of Freedom, The Note of Directness are excellent, nor are they any the worse for being in the main conventional, that is, sane and true, or for repeating much that Symonds, Jebb, Arnold, Ruskin and Pater have made familiar to the readers of the last generation. We need not hold him to too strict an account for the seeming contradictions into which he falls in the endeavor to attribute every type of excellence to the Greeks. In The Note of Humanism he tells us in one place (113) that the Greeks had not felt the difficulty of reconciling the higher and the lower nature, and did not need the solution of Christian grace. Yet some twenty pages later we read (136) that the Greeks "had indeed the emotional temperament of a southern nation, but they were continually fighting to keep it in subjection to reason. . . . Often the struggle ended in defeat; but the greatest Greeks

¹ Botsford, *Roman Assemblies*, 446, and Note 1.

did succeed in reigning in the rebellious horse, and reaching an Olympian peace. . . ." It is perhaps not Mr. Livingstone's fault that the word 'humanism' has been spoiled for all rational uses by Mr. Schiller and the Pragmatists. But though the chapter on The Note of Humanism is pleasant reading, it is quite impossible to accept as a single 'Note' an abstraction so comprehensive or so equivocal as to include the psychological relativity of Protagoras, the mythological anthropomorphism of Homer, the ordinary Greek's disbelief in a future life, the love of children illustrated by an anecdote in Herodotus, the cult of the body, the "genial ruffianism of Hipponax", the homely bourgeois naturalness of the *homme sensuel moyen* of Aristophanes, the Philistine common-sense of Xenophon, and the opportunities for personal culture provided by the age of Pericles in Macaulay's highly colored description. "It was the ordinary Athenian", Mr. Livingstone adds, to cap the climax, "who felt himself possessed and maddened with the passion for knowledge". For it is thus he renders and applies to the man in the street the phrases in which Alcibiades justifies his outspokenness to the initiates of philosophy in the Symposium.

More serious is the difficulty of reconciling Mr. Livingstone's general canons of true Hellenism with his account of particular authors, and his estimates of modern interpreters of the Greek genius. "In Germany", he says, "Professor von Wilamowitz, in England Professor Murray have entered into the Greek mind to a degree impossible to previous generations". This judgment is intelligible as an expression of enthusiastic admiration for the rare union of literary genius and high scholarship. But it is flatly incompatible with Mr. Livingstone's own interpretation of the Greek mind when he writes on page 21:

Even in the greatest Greeks there is much that we must ignore. Supposing Plato and Pindar to have a vein of Orphism, and Pythagoras queer ideas on numbers; supposing Aeschylus to be touched with mysticism and Euripides with mysticism and morbidity, the student of the Greek genius has a right to disregard these peculiarities, if he feels that he has his hand on an essential quality in Hellenism and that they are inconsistent with it.

If we are to take these words seriously, how can we in the same breath accept as our guide to the interpretation of the Greek spirit a scholar who bends all the resources of his genius and ingenuity to emphasizing everywhere precisely the traits of the Greek mind and the accidents of Greek culture which we regard as untypical? If, to take one of many available minor illustrations, Greek religion, as Mr. Livingstone believes, is fundamentally anthropomorphic and plastic, how can he follow the leadership of a critic who, in the November Atlantic, extracts from a skeptical Voltairian quip in Euripides the lesson that the Greek god was not an anthropomorphic statue, but the "wine of the

world". The essential quality of the Greek mind for Mr. Livingstone is the note of directness, which includes lucidity, rationalism, freedom from eccentricity, excess, superstition, humbug, and false sentiment. I believe that he is right, though like all who exploit this topic he heightens the contrast by treating as distinctive of the modern spirit mediaeval and renaissance conceptions which are as obsolete for the post-Darwinian generations as the Theogony of Hesiod was to Plato or Epicurus. But this view of the essential rationalism of the Greek mind ought to commit Mr. Livingstone in all courtesy, but in all firmness, to the repudiation of the presuppositions and the methods of the brilliant anthropological, mystic sentimental, and, we may now add, sociological school that has increasingly dominated English scholarship since the death of Jebb; and on which Professor Wilamowitz, I am pleased to note, has recently pronounced judgment in "petitio principii und schillernde Möglichkeiten sind üble Surrogate des Beweises".

Of a similar character is the difficulty which Mr. Livingstone finds in fitting the great writers of Greece into his scheme. When in chapter five he undertakes to illustrate his 'Notes' in the concrete, he dismisses for various reasons Thucydides, Aristophanes, Aeschylus and Sophocles. Plato is reserved for a chapter on some exceptions, and Euripides is postponed as belonging to the age of transition that initiates the decline. Pindar and Herodotus remain as types of Greek humanism. They are excellent types and Mr. Livingstone writes interestingly about them, but they do not especially well illustrate his chief 'Notes' of the Hellenic spirit, and, though he elsewhere recognizes Pindar as one of the world's great poets, his treatment of him here is spoiled by unconscious concessions to the twentieth century superstition that discovers more 'intellect' in *Candida* or in *Ghosts* than in the fourth Pythian. Pindar is to him the "commonplace intellect" and the smug comfortable Philistine whom the clever irony of the most popular of the present-day English interpreters of the Greek genius has taught us to patronize if not to scorn. The Nemesis of misinterpretation always dogs this blaspheming of the highest. In the noble passage on success and wealth in *Ol. 2.53 ff.* Mr. Livingstone, under the influence of these prepossessions, sees only an idea which he can find suggested in the fourth chapter of Xenophon's Symposium and expressed in Tennyson's Northern Farmer but which is not in this ode:

"Proputty, proputty's ivrything 'ere,
an', Sammy, I'm blest
If it isn't the saame oop yonder,
fur them as 'as it's the best".

"Wealth joined to . . . the gifts of nature . . . will give you chances which the ordinary man has

not, it will suppress the deeper cares, and in the end it will bring you to the Paradise of the Just. So at least Pindar implies. A strange key it seems with which to open heaven (141)". "And yet", he condescendingly adds, "there is some sense in Pindar's view; for the possession of wealth puts a man beyond the vulgar temptations of poverty", etc., etc. Is there no one left to appreciate Pindar in the country of Jebb, Myers, Matthew Arnold and Ruskin? It ought not to be necessary to say that "Pindar implies" nothing of what is here attributed to him. The words *εἰθε* [ye?] *νυν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον*, etc., are a transition to the myth of judgment. The religious tone of the passage is that of the Preacher's admonition 'But know thou that for all these things God shall bring thee into judgment'. It is not a promise that wealth will purchase heaven, but a warning that we shall be called to account for our use of opportunities, a warning whispered into the victor's ear in the very height of the triumph and exaltation which the Greek psalmist dreaded as the precursor of Hybris.

This minute scrutiny of special passages may be thought illiberal. But sober criticism must judge an interpreter's employment of the flash-light of the Universal according as he makes it serve to illuminate or to distort our vision of the particular. Nobody can escape the fallacy of generalization from insufficient evidence in this kind of work, but we can at least eschew false point-making in the texts of extant authors.

The description which the Symposium gives of Socrates standing through the night absorbed in meditation is a striking illustration of the contradictory uses to which good scholars may wrest the same passage. Professor Burnet, in his recently published *Phaedo*, triumphantly cites it in confirmation of his argument that Socrates was a Pythagorean mystic. To Mr. Livingstone it is proof positive that Socrates "though unfurnished with laboratories and test-tubes" "had something more important, if less imposing than these—the spirit of science". If constrained to choose I should prefer Mr. Livingstone's interpretation here, for Plato here and elsewhere represents Socrates's fits of abstraction not as the Indian fakir's contemplation of his navel, but as the thinker's absorption in a definite problem. But I would not press this or any other text quite so hard as the exigencies of conjectural philology or the universal philosophy of literature require. Mr. Livingstone yields to this temptation perhaps less frequently than some of his eminent contemporaries. But I will conclude with a few more examples submitted to his sober second thoughts. Is it not an equivocation on page 225 to contrast the ethical *goodness* of which "the English have a reasonable love" with the *ἀπερᾶς* of the chorus in the *Medea*, which the version quoted by himself renders 'godlike endeavor'. Is it quite fair to illustrate the difference between

ancient and modern feeling about nature by contrasting with Alcman's purple sea-bird of spring so extreme an instance of irrational sentimentality as Mrs. Browning's verses on the sea gull (75)? And to waive this point, is it quite true that Alcman himself "sees <in the bird only> what an unspoilt and happy child might see in it" (77)?

O maidens with voices of yearning plaint in honey-sweet accents heard,

The limbs of your singer wax old and faint; ah! would I might be as the bird.

A very little ingenuity would enable the maintainer of the opposite thesis to identify this wistful return of the old poet upon himself with the modern mood of Burns:

How can ye chant, ye little birds,
And I sae fu' o' care?

It is perhaps the part of a spoil-sport to object to point-making by the juxtaposition of extremes; and yet again I ask what possible significance for the genius of either Greek or English literature can there be in a comparison of the "different spirit" of Homer and—Oscar Wilde? And why in the name of all that is pure smirch Nausicaa by the suggestion of Wilde's *Salome*, when Howell's *Indian Summer* was available to illustrate a modern artist's treatment of the faint, sweet, unreal attraction of a girl toward an interesting older man?

In translating Euripides *Hippolytus* 194 by "*Sick of desire for an unknown bright thing beneath the earth*" Mr. Livingstone has apparently adopted along with the ideas of anthropological and Orphic philology its peculiar methods of construing Greek.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

PAUL SHOREY.

THE NEW YORK LATIN CLUB

The New York Latin Club met for its second luncheon of the current year at the Hotel Gregorian on February 8. Dr. B. W. Mitchell, of the Central High School, Philadelphia, President of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, read a most delightful paper entitled *In the Shadow of his Tail*; as the paper will soon be published in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY*, it would be unwise to give a resumé, which would necessarily fail to express the interest aroused by the address. Professor Knapp wittily presented the thanks of the Club to Dr. Mitchell.

The Committee which had been appointed by the president to take action in regard to the death of Mr. Harry Towle, an ex-president of the Club, and principal of the Curtis High School, New Brighton, Staten Island, reported through its chairman, Dr. Vlyman. The resolutions were adopted by the Club by a standing vote and were ordered spread on the minutes of the Club.

The President, Professor McCrea, then stated that inasmuch as the city syllabus stated that about

fifty per cent of the final examinations in Latin should be questions requiring "power" and only ten per cent of the last paper on Vergil had been on prose composition, he felt that the Club should protest to the educational authorities at Albany. He went on to show that if only this amount of prose was to be required the pupils who omitted prose entirely would undoubtedly do better than those who tried to do the usual amount of prose work. A discussion followed in which some of the members of the Club expressed the opinion that in the present state of the subject in High School work, where frequently but four periods a week were allowed in the last year for Latin, it was impossible to prepare pupils in prose as well as would be necessary should a larger amount of the paper be given to this subject. Dr. McCrea was of the opinion that the Club should ask the Board to stand by the syllabus, that is to adhere to its own published programme of work for the Schools. A resolution to this effect was adopted.

The Club then adjourned.

ANNA S. JENKINS, *Censor*.

GREEK IN THE NEW YORK CITY HIGH SCHOOLS

The idea has become rather definitely established, in the minds of the people at large and even among teachers of the Classics, that Greek is rapidly 'declining'. To get at the facts for the High Schools of New York City, as the basis of a report to The New York Latin Club, I wrote last month to each one in which Greek is taught, and secured the figures of enrolment for January, 1912, and for January, 1913. In Flushing and in the Boys' High School Greek is no longer elective, and I believe this is practically true also of DeWitt Clinton. In the table the schools showing the largest actual increase are put last.

	1912	1913
DeWitt Clinton	14	10
Flushing	3	0
Boys'	8	7
Wadleigh	28	34
Eastern District	49	57
Curtis	4	13
Jamaica	15	25
Erasmus Hall	131	190
Total	252	336

This shows an increase of exactly thirty-three and one third per cent in one year.

JAMAICA HIGH SCHOOL. EDWARD C. CHICKERING.

THE BALTIMORE CLASSICAL CLUB

The Baltimore Classical Club held its second meeting of the year on Saturday, February 8, at noon, at the Eastern High School, Baltimore, in the

gymnasium. Here the Classical Department of the High School had the evening before held a Roman banquet; the room was still decorated as for the banquet, a circumstance which gave quite a classical air to the occasion. The buffet luncheon proved successful in enabling the members to move about and become better acquainted, which was one of the objects in forming the Club, and in this respect seemed to have an advantage over a luncheon at tables.

Afterward the Club had the great pleasure of listening to a most interesting and witty paper on Propertius by Professor Kirby Flower Smith, of the Johns Hopkins University, in which Professor Smith gave some of his own delightful translations.

The next meeting of the Club will be held in conjunction with that of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, at the Johns Hopkins University, on May 2-3 next. MARY E. HARWOOD, Secretary.

The Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Art for February gives the accessions of 1912 within the Department of Classical Art; the more important pieces will all be described in subsequent numbers of the Bulletin. These acquisitions are temporarily on exhibition in the Boscoreale Room before their distribution to the appropriate galleries. In the same issue is a discussion of various books about American Museums. Mention is made of a pamphlet issued by the Worcester Art Museum, entitled a Handbook of the Museum adapted especially for Teachers and Study Classes, in which in accordance with the course of study followed in the various grades of the public schools are listed the objects in the Museum that illustrates history, literature and geography. This reminds me of two pamphlets distributed, by a representative of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, at a recent luncheon of The New York Latin Club. One pamphlet, entitled What the Metropolitan Museum of Art is Doing, tells what the Museum is doing to make its collections more helpful to teachers and students. The other, entitled Index to Objects illustrating Greek and Roman History, indicates what the Museum has bearing on the subjects named, and tells where the objects may be found. I am of the impression that these pamphlets may be had for the asking. C. K.

On Friday evening, February 7, the pupils of the Latin department of the Eastern High School, Baltimore, presented a Latin entertainment entitled *Ludus*. The programme included five numbers: (1) *Integer Vitae, Solo and Chorus*; (2) *Chorea*; (3) *Discipulae Somnium* (a dialogue between a *discipula* and *Caesaris Imago*); (4) *Nuptiae Romanae*, a series of five tableaux, representing *Ciceronis Domus*, *Atrium*, *Condicio*, *Sponsalia*, *Nuptae*, and *Deductio Domum*; (5) *Cena Romana*, in which the *gustus* consisted of *lactuca* and *sal*, the *cena* of *panis* and *hilla*, the *secunda mensa* of *placenta* and *citrus potio*. From the brief accounts at hand of the programme and especially from the title of the entertainment (*ludus*) one is perhaps justified in inferring that those in charge of the programme had in mind Miss Paxson's little book, *Two Latin Plays*, reviewed in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 5.1. Information about the entertainment may be had from Miss Margaret Garrett, Eastern High School, Baltimore.

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All persons within the territory of the Association who are interested in the language, the literature, the life and the art of ancient Greece and ancient Rome, whether actually engaged in teaching the Classics or not, are eligible to membership in the Association. Application for membership may be made to the Secretary-Treasurer, Charles Knapp, Barnard College, New York. The annual dues (which cover also the subscription to **THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY**) are two dollars. Within the territory covered by the Association (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia) subscription is possible to individuals only through membership. To institutions in this territory the subscription price is one dollar per year.

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